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Abstract
The robustness of classifiers has become a question of paramount importance in
the past few years. Indeed, it has been shown that state-of-the-art deep learning
architectures can easily be fooled with imperceptible changes to their inputs. There-
fore, finding good measures of robustness of a trained classifier is a key issue in
the field. In this paper, we point out that averaging the radius of robustness of
samples in a validation set is a statistically weak measure. We propose instead to
weight the importance of samples depending on their difficulty. We motivate the
proposed score by a theoretical case study using logistic regression, where we show
that the proposed score is independent of the choice of the samples it is evaluated
upon. We also empirically demonstrate the ability of the proposed score to measure
robustness of classifiers with little dependence on the choice of samples in more
complex settings, including deep convolutional neural networks and real datasets.
1 Introduction
Deep Learning is the golden standard for many challenges in the field of machine learning. Thanks to
a large number of tunable parameters, these architectures are able to absorb subtle dependencies from
large datasets and then to generalize decisions to previously unseen inputs. Among other examples,
Deep Learning is state-of-the-art in classification in vision [7], playing complex abstract games [11],
processing natural language [22], or decoding the brain activity [20].
However, despite achieving outstanding results, as typically measured as the accuracy on a validation
or test set, Deep Learning architectures are likely to fail at correctly classifying corrupted inputs. This
limitation has first been shown in [17], where the authors showed it is possible to fool the system
decision using a humanly imperceptible additive noise. This finding opened the way to a lot of
contributions where increasingly efficient attacks have been introduced [12]. If such attacks could be
considered artificial, in the sense that they require access to the network function, recent works [1, 8]
have shown that some black-box corruptions (where inputs are modified agnostically of the network
function) are likely to dramatically lower the accuracy of the system as well.
In the recent years, there have been an increasing number of works proposing mitigation strategies
to enhance the robustness of trained architectures. By robustness, most authors think of the ability
of the network function to maintain a good decision for a certain radius around the training or test
samples [15]. Examples of such strategies are listed in Section 2.
Robustness is intrinsically tied with generalization. Indeed, an ideal network function that would
correctly predict the class of any input would by definition be robust. Interestingly, let us point out
that this statement implies that even in the case of a perfect classifier, robustness cannot be thought
of uniformly for any input in a class domain. As a matter of fact, a classifier defines a partition of
the input domain in class regions. Hence some inputs are arbitrarily close to the boundary. It cannot
be expected that such inputs have a large radius of robustness. On the contrary, inputs chosen at the
center of class regions are likely to yield large such radii. This phenomenon is depicted in Figure 1.
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In this work, we introduce a new definition of robustness which aims at simplifying the comparison of
the intrinsic robustness of classifiers, by reducing the impact of the choice of samples it is estimated
on. More precisely, we have the following claims:
1. We introduce a new definition of robustness that is proved independent of the choice of the
samples it is estimated in the case of the logistic regression,
2. We perform experiments using challenging vision datasets and corruption benchmarks to
validate the interest of the proposed definition in a practical scenario.
x1
x2
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Figure (1a) represents the radii of robustness of two points x1 and x2 chosen in the same
class region. We observe that the maximum radius of robustness for x1 is much larger than that for
x2, as a consequence of their respective distances to the boundary. This drawing emphasizes the fact
that not all samples should be expected to have the same radius of robustness.
Figure (1b) shows two classes separated by two linear classifiers. When estimating robustness of
the classifier as the mean of the radius of each sample, we obtain that the orange dotted line is the
preferred one. When we account for the difficulty of samples, using our definition 3.4, we obtain that
the red solid line is the most robust. The latter is indeed more robust, as it yields a larger margin.
(a) Loss = 0.005 (b) Loss = 0.006 (c) Loss = 2.584 (d) Loss = 2.655
Figure 2: These pictures come from the CIFAR-10 dataset. The losses (cross-entropy) that are
indicated under them are computed using a trained ResNet18. (2a) and (2b) have the lowest losses of
the validation set, meanwhile (2c) and (2d) have the highest ones. As can be seen, the highest loss
correspond to samples that are more difficult to classify even for the human eye.
2 Related Work
Adversarial attacks
Adversarial attacks have been first put into light by [17]. They consist of deformations with minimal
norm, often imperceptible to the human eye, that causes the network to change its prediction with
high confidence. To create these deformations, a complete knowledge about the decision function of
the classifier, in particular its gradient, is needed. Numerous techniques have been created in order
to find the smallest attack, like the Fast Gradient Sign Method [6], the Projected Gradient Descent
[10] or the Deep Fool algorithm [12] among many others. The existence of these attacks shows that
neural networks of any kind can be sensible to small changes in an input, which causes important
security problems, for instance in the context of autonomous driving [4].
2
Black-box corruptions
One could argue that these deformations need perfect knowledge about the network function and
hence do not appear in practical life. However, [8] suggested black-box (i.e. agnostic of the network
function) corruptions that considerably damage predictions of state-of-art neural networks on the
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets. These corruptions imitate natural effects like rain, fog, JPEG
compression, brightness etc. Of course, they are no longer imperceptible, but they still are of interest
because much more bound to happen in real life than adversarial attacks. In our work, we will take
into account mainly adversarial attacks but also black-box corruptions in the appendix.
Defence against the attacks
In order to reduce the efficiency of these attacks, several options have been studied. One of the most
popular is adversarial training [6, 18, 5]: the idea is to find adversarial attacks for the elements of the
training set and to add them to it. It seems like this modified training also makes the network more
robust to unknown types of deformations and not only to those encountered during the training. Apart
from acting on the training set, another idea is to change the decision process, for instance through
randomized smoothing [3, 16] where the new prediction for an input is defined as the most likely
prediction by the base classifier on random Gaussian corruptions of this input. This technique smooths
the decision boundary and increases the distance of the inputs to it, thus increasing robustness. Finally,
some authors choose to work on the structure of the network function by forcing its Lipschitz constant
to be smaller than 1, either softly as it is the case in Parseval networks [2] or hardly [13]. We will
study the impact of some of these strategies on our proposed robustness score.
Certification of robustness
Instead of trying to make neural networks more robust to attacks that become increasingly more
efficient, one could want to give guarantees about the robustness of a classifier. Some authors
[14] followed this path and suggested ways to find the maximum safety radius of a classifier on a
dataset, that is the maximum r ≥ 0 such that any well-classified input is still well classified after any
deformation of norm less than r. Some took a probabilistic approach [21] and consider the maximum
r ≥ 0 such that there exists, with probability less than α, an adversarial attack of norm less than r.
We will show, both theoretically and empirically, that our certification is more robust that the classical
deterministic one because way less dependant of the samples the network it is evaluated upon.
3 Methodology
In this section we will present our theoretical approach to robustness.
3.1 The golden score of robustness
An ideal score of robustnessR∗(f,D) for a trained classifier f on a datasetD would be one satisfying
the followings properties:
(I) (Monotony) for two classifiers f1, f2 with the same test accuracy on D, if all well-classified
points are further from the decision boundary of f1 than from the one defined by f2, then
R∗(f1,D) ≥ R∗(f2,D).
(II) (Separability) if all well-classified points fromD are at distance 0 from the decision boundary
defined by f , then R∗(f,D) = 0.
(III) (Subset Independence) R∗(f,D) does not depend on the samples from D is it evaluated on.
(III) is of fundamental importance because the main objective of testing robustness is to ensure that in
the considered applications the classifier will be robust, and not only on the considered validation set.
3.2 The problems of mean-case and worst-case robustness
Let us suppose we have a labelled dataset D = (xi, yi)i composed of |D| elements where xi ∈ Rd
and yi ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. We denote by f a trained classifier that associates any valid input x with a
decision f(x) ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
The robustness of f is usually defined using the concept of the radius of robustness:
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Definition 3.1. The (maximum) radius of robustness of (x, y) with respect to the classifier f is
defined to be the largest r ≥ 0 such that
∀n ∈ Rd with ‖n‖q < r, we have f(x+ n) = y,
where ‖ · ‖q is the Lq norm. We will denote this maximum radius of robustness by rf (x, y) or simply
r(x, y) if there is no ambiguity. Note that r(x, y) = 0 for misclassified pairs (x, y).
Then, most authors introduce a measure of robustness as a simple statistical value depending on
r(D) = {r(xi, yi)i}. Two very common examples are the mean-case robustness [12], defined as:
Rm(D, f) = 1|D|
|D|∑
i=1
r(xi, yi), (1)
and the worst-case robustness, defined as:
Rw(D, f) =
|D|
min
i=1
r(xi, yi). (2)
It is easy to check that both of these definitions satisfy properties (I) and (II), but not (III). In practice,
robustness is measured using a validation set D, that is supposed to be a proxy to real-world data.
Obviously, the worst-case robustness is very sensitive to the choice of D, as removing the worst case
from it would likely change the measure of robustness. But even mean-case robustness is sensitive to
how examples in D are drawn. Consider the toy illustration of Figure 1a) for example, where we can
see two samples that are likely to yield very distinct radii of robustness, even for the most robust of
classifiers. As a consequence, sampling examples close to the boundary would cause a low value of
robustness, whereas sampling far form the boundary would cause a larger value.
One could argue that since classifiers are usually compared over the same validation set, there is no
major concern about this observation. Let us point out that considering the validation set is biased
towards easy or hard samples, it is very likely that the difference measured between two classifiers in
terms of robustness is a very weak statistical test.
As a matter of fact, wanting all samples to yield similar radii of robustness is not necessarily desirable
in practice, as some of these samples might approach the boundary between class regions. Consider
Figure 2 where we depicted easy and hard samples to classify according to the corresponding loss of
a trained classifier on the CIFAR-10 vision dataset. One would expect the easy samples to yield an
important radius of robustness, whereas hard ones would yield smaller radii. Problematically, it is not
known in advance precisely which samples are close to the boundary and which are far. In the next
section, we show that the radii of robustness of samples can be directly linked to their corresponding
loss for a trained classifier in the case of a logistic regression, so that it is possible to define a notion
of robustness that is statistically robust to the sampling of the validation set D it is tested upon.
3.3 Robustness and Loss
Let us show how radius of robustness and loss can be dependent, in the illustrative case of a logistic
regression. Consider f to be a multinomial logistic regression with parameters (βj , β0j )j=1,..,K where
βj ∈ Rd, β0j ∈ R and let D = {(xi, yi)1≤i≤|D|} be a dataset where xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Let `(x, y) be the cross-entropy loss for a sample (x, y), that is
`(x, k) = − log
(
exp(βk · x+ β0k)∑K
j=1 exp(βj · x+ β0j )
)
. (3)
We then have the following:
Proposition 3.2. For every well-classified input x belonging to class k, there exists m 6= k such that
−1
‖βm − βk‖ log
(
1
K − 1(exp `(x, k)− 1)
)
≤ r(x, k) ≤ −1‖βm − βk‖ log (exp `(x, k)− 1) , (4)
where r is defined for q = 2, i.e. the euclidean norm.
The proof of proposition (3.2) can be found in the appendix. When K = 2 we immediately have:
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Corollary 3.3. In the setting of binomial logistic regression, that is when the number of classes K is
equal to 2, we have
r(x, k) =
−1
‖β‖ log
(
exp `(x, k)− 1), (5)
where we denoted β := β2 − β1.
In the remaining of this work, we will denote g(t) = − log(exp t− 1) and we will always consider
`(x, y) to be the cross-entropy loss of a sample (x, y). In the context of binomial logistic regression,
a direct consequence of Corollary 3.3 is that if we sample elements in D using a probability measure
ν such that
ν(x, y) ∝ 1
g(`(x, y))
, (6)
the expectancy of the radius of robustness becomes α‖β‖2 where α is the test accuracy of the classifier
on D. In the case of SVMs, the quantity 1‖β‖2 happens to be the margin between the classes, a notion
obviously closely related to robustness. This motivates the following general definition:
Definition 3.4. We call difficulty-aware robustness of a classifier f over a dataset D =
{(xi, yi)1≤i≤|D|} the quantity:
Eν
[
(r(xi, yi))1≤i≤|D|
]
.
where ν is a probability distribution on D. It is pretty easy to check that irrespective of the probability
distribution, the score satisfies properties (I) and (II) stated in section 3.1.
In this article, our major statement is the following: for any deep neural network using the cross-
entropy loss `, r(x, y) increases approximately linearly with g(`(x, y)), hence the score
Rν := Eν
[
(r(xi, yi))1≤i≤|D|
]
=
1
|D|
|D|∑
i=1
r(xi, yi)
g(`(xi, yi))
(7)
becomes a statistical quantity aiming at evaluating the slope of the line (g(`(x, y)), r(x, y)). Intu-
itively, the greater this slope is, the faster the radius of robustness increases as we move away from
the class boundary to the center of the class. Implicitly, we set ν as in (6).
Corollary 3.3 guarantees that this statement is completely true for binomial logistic regression and
Proposition 3.2 tells us it is pretty accurate for multinomial logistic regression. In the experiments
section, we shall empirically confirm this statement for complex architectures and datasets, and see
how this score predicts the quality of generalization in controlled synthetic cases and real-life datasets.
Just before that, let us study how robustness can be seen through a probabilistic viewpoint.
3.4 On the difficulty of estimating the radius of robustness
A major problem with the proposed definition is that it requires to compute the radius of robustness of
samples for a given classifier, which is expected to be hard in practice. Moreover, it is very different to
be robust in every possible direction of space but a few, or to be robust in half the possible directions.
To account for these notions, we also propose to incorporate a trade-off between the (probabilistic)
radius ε we consider and the probability α that the decision of the considered classifier is wrong.
Definition 3.5. Given α ∈ [0, 1], we define the distribution-specific trade-off of robustness of a
classifier f for a random variable Z and around a sample x of class y as the largest ε ≥ 0 such that:
P [ f(x+ εZ) 6= y] ≤ α. (8)
In the remaining of this work, we often consider the isotropic trade-off of robustness, which is the
distribution-specific trade-off obtained when Z is a random variable uniformly distributed on the unit
ball centered on 0.
Now let us exhibit a bound on this isotropic trade-off of robustness. We consider here the L∞-norm,
so that we can use the well known bound by Hoeffding [9]:
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Theorem 3.6. Let X1, ..., Xn be independent random variables such that Xi takes values in the
interval [ai, bi]. Set X := 1n (X1 + · · ·+Xn). Then:
P
(
X − E [X] ≥ t) ≤ exp( −2n2t2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
(9)
where t ≥ 0.
We apply this bound in the following way: in the situation of binomial regression of parameters
(β, β0) ∈ Rd × R, consider a given point x with f(x) = 1, i.e. β0 + β · x > 0. Consider a noise
variable Z that is uniformly distributed on the L∞ unit ball, which means that the coordinates Zi of
Z are i.i.d. random variables with uniform distribution on [−1, 1]. Then:
P [ f(x+ εZ) 6= y] = P [εβ · Z < −(β0 + β · x)] = P [β · Z > β0 + β · x
ε
]
by the symmetry of Z. Hence:
P[ f(x+ εZ) 6= y] = P
[∑
i
βiZi >
β0 + β · x
ε
]
.
To the right hand side we may apply Hoeffdings’s inequality. Note that Xi := βiZi is symmetrically
distributed around the origin, with |Xi| ≤ βi and E[Xi] := E[Zi] = 0. Thus, using (9):
P[ f(x+ εZ) 6= y] ≤ P
[
1
d
∑
i
βiZi >
β0 + β · x
dε
]
≤ exp
(
− (β0 + β · x)
2
2ε2
∑d
i=1 β
2
i
)
= exp
(
− r
2
2ε2
)
,
where r is the radius of robustness of x for the L2 norm. Let us choose ε such that
α = exp
(
− r
2
2ε2
)
, i.e. ε =
r√−2 log (α) . (10)
Interestingly, Equation (10) shows that it holds a threshold phenomenon: for a small value of α, ε
vanishes quickly while for α closer to 1, ε explodes.
For a fixed (small) value of α, Equation (10) indicates that if we can estimate the optimal value of ε
satisfying (8), this gives us an upper bound for the radius of robustness r. However, in practice, ε is
not easier to estimate than r. In the experiments, we directly estimate the values of r by simulations.
4 Experiments
In the following experiments, we work with the L2 norm, unless mentioned otherwise.
4.1 Synthetic data
We first want to challenge the relevancy of our definition of robustness in Equation (7) on completely
controlled data and in the simple setup of logistic regression. To do so, we sample points from two
two-dimensional isotropic Gaussian distributions of same standard deviation and different mean and
call this dataset D. We know the expression of the asymptotically best classifier, which is the median
of the means of the two Gaussian distributions. We call this classifier the baseline and denote it by
(β∗, β0∗). Now, we define a distance on linear classifiers. Let (β1, β01) and (β2, β
0
2) defining two
linear classifiers, then the distance between these two is defined as:
d
(
(β1, β
0
1), (β2, β
0
2)
)
:= ‖β2 − β1‖2 + |β02 − β01 |.
In this setup, we study the evolution of the proposed score Rν(fβ ,D) as a function of the distance
d((β∗, β0∗), (β, β0)), that is the distance of the classifier (β, β0) to the baseline. Namely, for each
distance d, we randomly pick n classifiers (β, β0) of distance d to the baseline and we average their
scores Rν . The result of our experiment is depicted on figure (3).
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Figure 3: Evolution of the score Rν with respect to the distance to the base classifier. The score has
been normalized so that it is equal to 1 at d = 0.
We observe some fluctuations around 1 at the beginning, which is not so surprising as (β∗, β0∗) is
only asymptotically best. Apart from that, the score Rν has the awaited behaviour as it decreases
smoothly as we go away from the asymptotically optimal classifier.
4.2 Correlation between Loss and Robustness
In the following, we investigate further for several architectures and real-life data the link between
loss and radius of robustness.
We train a multinomial logistic regression classifier on the MNIST dataset and, for 100 points in the
validation set, plot their loss and their radii of robustness. They are depicted as blue dots on Figure
(4a). To compute this radius we proceed by dichotomy: at each step, we try in at most 5000 random
directions of fixed norm to find a deformation that changes the class of the data point. If one is found
we try with half the radius. We stop when the precision on the radius attains approximately 0.5.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
50
100
g(`)
Radius of robustness
(a)
2 4 6 8 10
20
40
g(`)
Radius of robustness
(b)
Figure 4: Figure (4a) shows points of the MNIST dataset scattered according to g(loss) and their
radius of robustness. Blue and red dots respectively correspond to a logistic regression and to LeNet5.
Figure (4b) is the same type of plot for a ResNet18 trained on CIFAR-10 without data augmentation.
In the case of the logistic regression, a linear regression gives us that, with a coefficient of deter-
mination of 0.93, the radius of robustness is a linear function of g(loss). We have the same kind
of behaviour for LeNet5 and for a ResNet on CIFAR-10: except for some outliers, the radius still
grows linearly with g(loss). Thus, we empirically verified that this behaviour holds in the case of a
multinomial logistic regression, a CNN like LeNet5 and a Residual Neural Network trained with real
data.
4.3 A dataset-independent score
For a logistic regression, the scoreRν is designed to be completely independent of the dataset samples
it is evaluated upon. Let us stress if this property holds for complex neural networks, like LeNet5
trained on MNIST and a ResNet18 trained on CIFAR-10. We first randomly pick 100 samples from
the validation sets. Then, we order them according to their loss: this is a pretty legitimate way of
evaluating their difficulty. We split them in half to have in one hand the 50 easiest samples and in the
other hand the 50 hardest ones. Finally we compute the mean score Rm and the proposed score Rν
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on both subsets and study their difference. Results are presented in Table 1. The relative variation
(rel. var.) is defined as |Re −Rh|/(Re +Rh) where Re and Rh are respectively the scores on the
easy and hard subsets.
Table 1: Rm and Rν scores on easy and hard subsets of two datasets, MNIST and CIFAR-10,
respectively computed for LeNet5 and a ResNet18.
Rm Rν
easy hard rel. var. easy hard rel. var.
LeNet5 55.2 24.6 0.38 1.63 1.91 0.08
ResNet18 11.4 4.5 0.44 0.68 0.54 0.12
We notice that, for both networks, the relative variation between the mean scores on the easy and
hard subsets is around 4 times the one of the score Rν . This shows empirically that the Rν is less
dependent of the dataset that Rm is and therefore that it goes towards verifying property (III).
Remark 4.1. We also notice that in the case of LeNet5, the score Rν is higher on the hard sub-
set than on the easy one. This may indeed happen as this score measures the slope of the line
(g(`(x, y)), r(x, y)) and not directly the radii.
4.4 Influence of adversarial training
Next, we study the effect of increasing the robustness of a classifier. We choose to consider the work
in [10], where Madry and al. studied the effect of adversarial training on the MNIST and CIFAR-
10 datasets. They released a GitHub repository https://github.com/MadryLab/CIFAR-10_
challenge.git from which we downloaded pre-trained networks on CIFAR-10, both with and
without adversarial training. Using this repository, we computed both the mean score of robustness
Rm and the difficulty-aware score Rν for the two networks. In Table 2, we present the results
computed using 60 samples:
Table 2: Scores of robustness on naturally and adversarially trained networks on CIFAR-10.
Rm Rν
Naturally trained network 2.4 0.25
Adversarially trained network 7.1 1.49
We notice for both scores an increase. This supports the fact that these scores do measure well the
gain in robustness of adversarially trained networks for complex datasets.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we pointed out the limits of using the mean radius to measure the robustness of a
classifier. We showed that it is expected that some samples yield larger radii than others, depending
on their difficulty and typicality. As such, we designed a simple score of robustness that accounts
for this variation. We proved this score is theoretically independent of the choice of the samples for
the simple case of a binomial logistic regression. We also derived multiple experiments with various
datasets and neural network architectures to demonstrate that it still provides an interesting measure
of robustness for more complex settings. Finally, the computational cost of this score is the same
as the classical mean-case Rm and worst-case Rw as it is only needed to compute the losses of the
samples on top of the radii, which consists in a negligible additional cost. In future work, it would be
interesting to investigate whether sampling training inputs depending on their distance to the class
boundary could result in more robust trained classifiers.
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6 Broader impact
Adversarial attacks can prove to be life-threatening: in [4], the authors showed that it is possible to
fool state-of-the-art classifiers by simply putting small stickers on stop signs. The classifiers then
believe they are looking at a speed-limit sign, which can of course lead to a very dangerous behaviour
from an autonomous car driven by a neural network. Also, [8] showed that real-life perturbations like
rain or fog can considerably damage the performance of a classifier. It is therefore of first importance
to measure and eventually increase the robustness of Deep Learning architectures. In this context, our
work goes towards this goal by giving a more intrinsic and accurate measure of robustness.
Furthermore, robustness is intrinsically linked to explainability [19], the latter being a central issue in
today’s law regarding Artificial Intelligence. That is why increasing the robustness of Deep Learning
architectures can only facilitate the wide use of this technology in the near future.
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1 Proof of proposition (3.2)
We give here the proof of proposition (3.2) which holds in the context of multinomial logistic
regression:
Proposition 3.2. For every well-classified input x belonging to class k, there exists m 6= k such that
−1
‖βm − βk‖ log
(
1
K − 1(exp `(x, k)− 1)
)
≤ r(x, k) ≤ −1‖βm − βk‖ log
(
exp `(x, k)− 1), (1)
where r is defined for q = 2, i.e. the euclidean norm.
Proof. Because we suppose that the logistic regression classifies well x, we have
exp(βk · x+ β0k) ≥ exp(βj · x+ β0j ), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (2)
The radius of robustness is defined as the smallest r ≥ 0 such that
∃n ∈ Rd, ‖n‖ = r | ∃m ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such that
exp(βk · (x+ n) + β0k) = exp(βm · (x+ n) + β0m), (3)
i.e.
(βk − βm) · (x+ n) + (β0k − β0m) = 0. (4)
Hence the radius of robustness is the distance of x from the hyperplane defined by equation (4), i.e.
r(x, k) =
(βk − βm) · x+ (β0k − β0m)
‖βk − βm‖ . (5)
Now, we have
`(x, k) = − log
(
exp(βk · x+ β0k)∑K
j=1 exp(βj · x+ β0j )
)
(6)
= − log
(
1∑K
j=1 exp
(
(βj − βk) · x+ (β0j − β0k)
)) (7)
= log
(
K∑
j=1
exp
(
(βj − βk) · x+ (β0j − β0k)
))
(8)
= log
(
1 + exp(−‖βm − βk‖ · r(x, k)) (9)
+
∑
j 6∈{k,m}
exp
(
(βj − βk) · x+ (β0j − β0k)
))
.
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Hence,
l(x, k) ≥ log
(
1 + exp
(− ‖βm − βk‖ · r(x, k))). (10)
To get the theorem’s second inequality, it suffices to invert this expression.
Now, ∀j 6∈ {k,m},
exp
(
(βj − βk) · x+ (β0j − β0k)
)
= exp
(
(βj − βm) · x+ (β0j − β0m)
)
(11)
× exp ((βm − βk) · x+ (β0m − β0k))
≤ 1× exp(−‖βm − βk‖ · r(x, k)). (12)
Hence from (9) we get
l(x, k) ≤ log
(
1 + (K − 1) exp (− ‖βm − βk‖ · r(x, k))). (13)
To get the theorem’s first inequality it suffices again to invert this expression.
2 Further experiments about the dataset quality
In this section, we challenge further our idea that every samples have different qualities. More
precisely, we see in the following experiments that some samples, without being great in number,
worsen a lot the robustness of a classifier.
2.1 Heat map on CIFAR-10
We work here with a randomly picked subset of size 300 of the validation set of CIFAR-10. Our
classifier is a ResNet18 trained on CIFAR-10 without data augmentation. We now plot a heat map
with the heat being the accuracy error of this network on the chosen subset, see Figure (1a). The
latter subset is distorted with a random Gaussian noise of euclidean norm r (x-axis). Furthermore,
we reduce the subset size from 300 to d (y-axis) by keeping the d samples (not distorted) with the
lowest loss. In order to smooth the map, we make 50 simulations for each point (x, y).
Thank to this heat map, we can study at the same time the evolution of the accuracy error regarding to
• the intensity of the noise applied to the inputs (x-axis)
• the quality of the dataset (y-axis)
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Figure 1: Figure (1a) shows the accuracy heat map, which details can be found at the beginning of
section 2.1. Figure (1b) shows the evolution of the Mean Corruption Error as a function of the quality
of the dataset.
We see that if we keep all the data set, i.e. for the line corresponding to y = 300, there is no minimum
radius of robustness. However, if we begin to remove pathological samples, that is with high loss, we
observe the existence of a radius of protection (the dark blue area).
2
2.2 Mean Corruption Error on CIFAR-10
In [1], Hendrycks and al. suggest several kind of deformations for the CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
datasets that can happen in real-life, like rain, fog, JPEG compression etc. For a ResNet18 trained
without data augmentation on CIFAR-10, we compute the errors corresponding to each deformation.
We call their mean the Mean Corruption Error (MCE). We plot this quantity for different size of the
data set, again selected according to the loss. We again perform an averaging procedure: for each
length ` of the data set, we select several random subset (of size 300) of the total data set (of size
10000). For each subset, we select the ` samples with the lowest loss and compute with them the
MCE. Finally, we averaged the obtained values. The result is depicted in Figure (1b).
We observe three distinct trends. First, when the data set is only composed of easy (i.e. with low
loss) samples, the MCE is equal to 0. Then, around the middle size of the data set, the MCE begins
to grow linearly. Finally, next to the four fifths, the MCE grows much faster and also linearly. This
behaviour confirms the fact that a small number of samples, here one fifth, has a very big impact on
the measured robustness of a classifier.
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